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1 Introduction
Innovation is a persistent source of economic growth (Aghion, 1992; Grossman and Helpman, 1991). However,
in the new knowledge-based economy some of the intrinsic features of each society influence the ability of
its economic system to translate innovative efforts and external knowledge flows into economic growth.
The innovation systems literature focuses on the role of institutions in determining technological change,
and stresses the importance of institutions such as universities and research institutes being linked to the
production or diffusion of innovations (Barbosa and Faria, 2011; Lundvall, 1992). Furthermore, empirical
analysis shows that institutional differences affect the extent of R&D spillovers; for example, countries where
the ease of doing business, the quality of the tertiary education system and the level of patent protection
are relatively high benefit more from R&D efforts and international R&D spillovers (Coe, Helpman and
Hoffmaister, 2009; Tebaldi and Elmslie, 2013). A related field of research underlines the influence of intangible
assets and specific institutional characteristics on innovation capacity at the regional level (Crescenzi and
Rodríguez -Pose, 2011; d’Agostino and Scarlato, 2011; Dettori, Marrocu and Paci, 2011; Rodríguez -Pose,
1999; Rodríguez-Pose and Crescenzi, 2008; Sterlacchini, 2008).
More broadly, recent studies argue that differences in per capita income can be explained by features
of societal organisation that may prevent a country from adopting the best technologies (Acemoglu et al.,
2005; Barbosa and Faria, 2011; Tabellini, 2008). For example, institutional failure may emerge when tech-
nological advancement represents a threat to the ruling groups and such groups consequently decide to block
innovations to preserve their political power (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000; Acemoglu, 2006). According
to Acemoglu (2012), civil and political rights are strictly intertwined with technological development and
the various dynamics of economic growth. Similarly, other studies highlight that interest groups engaging in
rent-protecting activities may constitute structural barriers to innovation and growth (Dias and McDermott,
2006; Dynopoulos and Syropoulos, 2007; Parente and Zhao, 2006; Van Long and Sorger, 2006).
What emerges from these different fields of research is that inclusive institutions, i.e. institutions that
provide incentives and opportunities for a broad cross-section of society, are favourable to both technological
progress and economic growth (Acemoglu, 2012). Our paper integrates these areas of the literature and
investigates the theoretical foundations of the linkage between inclusive institutions and economic growth,
emphasising innovation as the intermediate variable that drives this interplay. This paper incorporates,
within the general definition of institutional quality, social and institutional factors that promote inclusiveness
and social cohesion. It shows that these factors serve as preconditions for the successful exploitation of
knowledge, and analyses how their combination persistently hampers or enhances the ability of a country to
foster economic growth.
At a more detailed level, this paper focuses on the influence of social and institutional quality on innov-
ation. The link between these variables may be attributable to a number of factors. For example, a growing
body of literature investigates the links through which inclusive institutions influence technological change
and factor accumulation by examining the relationship between institutions, human capital and knowledge
creation (Dias and McDermott, 2006; Dias and Tebaldi, 2012; Tebaldi and Elmslie, 2008 ). In particular, Dias
and Tebaldi (2012) propose a model in which institutions that ensure the human capital market functions
effectively increase the return to education, thus stimulating human capital accumulation. As a consequence,
such institutions indirectly increase the productivity of the economy, boosting knowledge creation and the
rate of economic growth. Similarly, Dias and McDermott (2006) present a model based on the assumption
that good institutions stimulate entrepreneurship in the modern goods sector, encouraging workers to invest
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in education. The accumulation of human capital then leads to more rapid structural transformation and
economic growth. The link between inclusive institutions and innovation can also be direct. For example,
institutional reforms have a direct influence on knowledge creation through incentives to undertake R&D
activities generated by market-friendly policies such as improvements in the patent system and property
rights enforcement (Tebaldi and Elmslie, 2008; 2013).
This paper reveals several new insights to the literature. First, it suggests that inclusive institutions affect
the productivity of economy-wide inputs and the diffusion of knowledge. In particular, inclusive institutions
speed up the dissemination of ideas, promote cooperation among researchers, and strengthen the flow of
knowledge from educated to non-educated workers (Dias and Tebaldi, 2012; Hauser, Tappeiner and Walde,
2007; Miguélez, Moreno and Artís, 2011; Tebaldi and Elmslie, 2008). Second, this paper demonstrates that
investments in innovative activities are fully exploited in an enviroment in which people trust each other and
are connected by dense network relationships, repeated interaction and shared values. This is made possible
through different channels: social networks provide for better enforcement of informal norms, thus reducing
monitoring costs (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Sabatini, 2099a; Sabatini, 2009b). Moreover, social networks
improve information about quality firms and projects (Bjørnskov, 2010; Dearmon and Grier, 2011; Hug and
Spörri, 2011; Zak and Knack, 2001) and increase the probability of good ideas receiving finance (Akçomak
and ter Weel, 2009; Rost, 2011). In both cases, the effect is to provide an incentive for the adoption of
new ideas and technologies. In contrast, low levels of social interaction and trust disincentivise cooperative
behaviour, hinder creativity, increase uncertainty and hamper risky innovative activities.
In brief, we argue that low-quality social and institutional conditions impose negative externalities on the
absorption and diffusion of innovation. In turn, these negative social and institutional externalities reduce
economic growth. The key contributions of this paper are twofold. First, we encapsulate the aforementioned
hypotheses in a non-scale R&D-based growth model incorporating negative social and institutional extern-
alities that not only affect the productivity of private and human capital, but also constrain the diffusion
of existing technological knowledge. The second main contribution of the paper is to provide new empirical
results for a sample of European Union (EU) countries.
The focus on the EU is motivated by the current discussion on policies to enhance economic growth
after the failure of the Lisbon Strategy, for which the underlying belief is that more competition and less
regulation bolster innovation and thus growth (Barbosa and Faria, 2011). More recently, improving social
and institutional quality has been included as one of the principle objectives of the EU under the general
framework of sustainable development and in the regional policy framework (Biagi and Lambir, 2007; Farole,
Rodríguez -Pose and Storper, 2011). In particular, five objectives have been set as part of the so-called Europe
2020 growth strategy - employment, innovation, education, social inclusion and climate/energy - which are
to be achieved by 2020 (European Commission, 2010). From this perspective, environmental and social
sustainability targets are regarded as complementary to a process of economic growth driven by innovation,
recognising the unequal distribution of environmental burdens and health risks across social groups (Nunes
et al., 2011; EEC, 2008; Serrel and Johnstone, 2006) and the influence of the environment on well-being
(Welsch, 2006; Silva, de Keulenaer and Johnstone, 2012). This strategy also recognises that countries with
a better quality of government (government that is impartial, efficient and non-corrupt) also score higher in
dimensions related to the welfare of citizens, environmental sustainability and income inequality, and that
higher institutional quality leads to better economic performance (Besley and Persson, 2009; Besley, Persson
and Reynals-Querol, 2012; Charron, Dykstra and Lapuente, 2012).
Our empirical analysis based on pooled long- and short-run estimates confirms the importance of private
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capital and technology as instruments to increase economic growth in European countries, and suggests
the existence of a positive relationship between inclusive institutions, innovation and economic growth.
Elasticity measures show that reforming institutions with the aim of enhancing governance, social inclusion
and environmental sustainability may generate strong incentives for private investment, knowledge diffusion
and the adoption of technological innovation, thus promoting economic growth. The estimates also show
that market failures linked to the degree of market competition and to the level of network interaction in the
economic system significantly condition the influence of formal institutions on private capital, technology
and GDP growth.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present the theoretical framework of
our analysis. In Section 3, we run estimates for a sample of European countries to test our arguments and
discuss the empirical results. In the final section we conclude the paper by summarising the main findings
and highlighting relevant policy implications of our work.
2 Theoretical framework
This section provides a detailed discussion of the non-scale R&D-based growth model we employ to analyse
patterns of economic growth conditioned on the technological knowledge accumulation process. In line
with Steger (2005a), our theoretical framework introduces two negative externalities into the technological
knowledge accumulation function that generate non-explosive economic growth. These externalities not only
affect the productivity of private and human capital, but also constrain the diffusion of existing technological
knowledge. Unlike previous contributors to this field (Eicher, 2000; Eicher, 2001; Jones, 1995; Peretto,
2002), we propose a model in which these externalities are identified on the basis of institutional quality and
network relationships in a given country. Although institutional quality is uniquely used to identify the first
negative externality, both institutional quality and network relationships affect the diffusion of technological
knowledge already accumulated. Our comprehensive model is composed of three different sectors dealing
respectively with the production of an homogenous final output (the final output sector, FO), several varieties
of intermediate goods (the capital goods sector, CG) and blueprints (the research and development sector,
R&D).
2.1 The final output sector
Consider a sector comprising of a large number of firms, nFO, ordered on the interval [0, 1]. The firms
produce a single homogeneous good that is sold in a competitive market and can be consumed or invested.
The production function faced by the firms in the final output sector is:
Y = (θL)
σL
ˆ A
0
[φx(i)]
σK di with σL, σk < 1 and σL + σk = 1, (1)
where Y is the final output and L is the stock of labour in the entire economic system, which grows at a
constant rate L˙ = nL (where n is the sum of labour employed in the final output sector and labour employed
in the R&D sector). The variable x(i) is the number of intermediate capital goods of type i produced in the
capital goods sector that are ordered in the interval [0, A], where A describes the availability of intermediate
capital goods at every point in time. In addition, θ and φ are the shares of intermediate goods and labour
employed in the final output sector [0 ≤ θ, φ ≤ 1], where [1− θ, 1− φ] are the shares of the same variables
in the R&D sector.
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Because the elasticity of substitution between different capital goods is constant and equal to  =
(1/1− σK)1, and given the symmetry of x(i) 2, the technology behind the production of final output (1) can
be rewritten as:
Y = A1−σK (θL)σL (φK)σK , (2)
which states that total factor productivity A may change according to the number of intermediate capital
goods. As a consequence, given that FO is a perfect competition sector3, the optimal demand price for
capital goods is given by PFOD =
[
(−1)

Y
φK
]
4. Given Equation (2), the dynamics of the aggregate capital
stock are given by:
K˙ = Y − C = A1−σK (θL)σL (φK)σK − C, (3)
where C is total consumption.
2.2 The capital goods sector
As introduced above, the different varieties of capital goods x(i) are produced in a separate sector comprising
a large number of firms ordered in an interval [0, A]. To start producing a capital good x, each firm needs to
buy a blueprint from the R&D sector, to become the only producer of that variety of good in a monopolistic
regime. As a consequence, each firm determines the optimal quantity of capital goods to sell to the FO
and R&D sectors that maximises its operating profit given by pi = [p(x)− r]x, where p(x) is the price of
the good and r is the gross interest rate. The standard solution for maximising profit defines the optimal
quantity x and price p(x) in the capital goods sector. Moreover, because the other two sectors include a
large number of firms, the elasticity of substitution among CG is equal to the respective price elasticities of
demand in FO (denoted by 1) and R&D (denoted by 2). This means that we can simplify the model by
assuming that  = 1 = 25, and leads to PD = PR&DD = P
FO
D =
[
(−1)

Y
φx
]
6, where PR&DD is the demand
price in the R&D sector. Given that demand and supply prices are the same (PD = PS) in equilibrium, we
can rearrange the operating profit function as pi =
[
(−1)

Y
φx
]
x − rx, which yields the optimal CG supply
price PS =
[

−1r
]
and the gross interest rate r =
[
(−1)

]2
Y
φK . Following Steger (2005b), each firm becomes
the only producer of a single variety i of a capital good. As a consequence, the CG sector is characterised
by monopolistic competition, and this leads to positive mark-ups of prices over marginal cost, which causes
underinvestment in the R&D sector. This market failure justifies policy intervention to restore competition
in the capital goods sector (Aghion et al. 2004; Griffith, Harrison and Macartney, 2007). In practice, because
the monopolistic power of the firm in the CG sector changes the equilibrium between demand and supply
across the entire economic system, we must control for such power to account for the influence of technology
1The last equation leads to the definition σk = −1 .
2Following d’Agostino and Scarlato (2011), the solution for the profit maximisation process in the CG sector states that
every firm sets the same price and sells the same quantity of the durable good it produces. Because intermediate goods and
capital are linked by the relation K =
´A
0 xdi = Ax, where x is the optimal quantity of intermediate goods sold, this leads to
the symmetry of x(i). See subsection 2.2 for more details.
3The production function in (2) is required to exhibit constant returns to scale in private inputs to guarantee competitive
equilibrium in the FO sector.
4From an algebraic point of view, the last equation is obtained by the first derivative of (2) with respect to K, where we
substitute  = 1/1− σK .
5This assumption guarantees that the CG producer has no incentive to differentiate prices across the FO and R&D sectors.
6Remembering that K = Ax, this expression is equivalent to PD =
[
(−1)

Y
φK
]
.
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and private investment on consumption growth rate. Thus, throughout our analysis, we include the market
power control defined as ucomp.
2.3 The research and development sector
The last sector, the research and development sector (R&D), is characterised by a large number of firms
ordered on the interval [0, 1] that operate in a perfect competition regime. In accordance with Steger
(2005b), the growth rate of the stock of knowledge (or technology) in the economy is linked to the level of
technological knowledge and the shares of labour and private capital employed in the sector7. The function
can be expressed as follow:
A˙ = J = AηA [(1− θ)L]ηL [(1− φ)K]ηK , (4)
with ηL = ηPL + η
e
L, ηK = η
P
K + η
e
K , η
so
A , η
P
K η
P
L > 0, where η
e
K η
e
L < 0 and ηA = η
SO
A + (1− ηK). This model
formulation allows for constant returns to scale in private inputs (ηpk+η
p
L = 1), but decreasing returns to scale
across the entire system, which is guaranteed by the negative externalities associated with economy-wide
averages of private resources (ηek, η
e
L < 0). In addition, η
SO
A describes the degree of diffusion of technological
knowledge already accumulated in the R&D sector (Steger, 2005a; Jones, 1995). Increasing values of ηek
and ηeL reduce the overall productivity of private capital 1− φ and human capital 1− θ, and they constrain
the diffusion of technological knowledge already accumulated A. However, because the growth rate of the
stock of knowledge exhibits constant returns to scale, these negative externalities also reduce the elasticities
of private capital, human capital and existing knowledge with respect to the growth rate of the stock of
knowledge.
We propose two distinct hypotheses to identify the negative externalities associated with economy-wide
averages of private resources (ηeK η
e
L) and the degree of diffusion of technological knowledge already accumu-
lated in the R&D sector (ηSOA ):
H1: Institutions that are not inclusive, as indicated by a low level of institutional quality, affect the gen-
eration of new technology by constraining the productivity of economy-wide inputs and the overall
elasticities of private capital, human capital and existing knowledge with respect to the growth rate of
the stock of knowledge.
We define ηeK and η
e
L as the negative externalities of low institutional quality on private capital and human
capital, respectively. However, Aη
SO
A +(1−ηK), the negative externality linked to private capital, ηeK , also
affects the degree of diffusion of technological knowledge already accumulated in the R&D sector, in line
with d’Agostino and Scarlato (2011).
Unlike previous contributions to this field (Eicher et al., 2000; Eicher, 2001; Jones, 1995; Peretto and
Smulders, 2002), H1 proposes that the adoption of new ideas or blueprints is constrained by the background
social and institutional context in which new discoveries take place. Indeed, the dynamics of innovation
depend on the ability of the economic system to translate innovative efforts and external knowledge flows
into economic growth (Acemoglu, 2012; Tebaldi and Elmslie, 2008). To define ηSOA in more detail, we propose
a second hypothesis:
H2: The presence of network relationships increases the degree of diffusion of existing knowledge.
7Symmetrically to (1), the R&D technology is defined by A˙ = Aη
SO
[(1− θ)L]ηL ´A0 [(1− φ)x(i)]ηK di.
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We measure the positive spillovers generated by network relationships by the degree of diffusion of techno-
logical knowledge already accumulated in the R&D sector ηSOA . Akçomak and ter Weel (2009) show that
network interactions emerge when researchers and capital providers trust each other, thus facilitating the
diffusion of ideas within the R&D sector and the adoption of innovations in the economic system. Further-
more, network interactions are crucial in facilitating the horizontal integration of small and medium firms,
which generates positive spillovers to innovation.
According to Hypotheses 1 and 2, we have two opposite effects linked to the degree of diffusion of
technological knowledge already accumulated in the R&D sector: one depending on the negative externality
generated by low institutional quality on private capital ηeK and human capital η
e
L, and the other depending
on the positive spillovers produced by network relationships ηSOA . This means that to identify the first effect,
we have to control for the second. Because we are interested in identifying the first effect, we treat network
interaction spillovers as a second source of control in the cross-country comparison. We define this control
as unetint.
Returning to the model, the price of one design or blueprint in the R&D sector is given by v(t) =´∞
t
pi(τ)e−
´ τ
t
r(u)dudτ , which becomes v˙ = rv − pi by differencing the last equation with respect to time.
Substituting r and pi into the latter then gives the rate at which the price of one design or blueprint grows:
v˙ =
[
(− 1)

]2
Y
φK
− (− 1)
2
Y
φA
, (5)
which shows that including only private returns in the price of one design or blueprint and the growth thereof
leads to the emergence of a second market distortion. Furthermore, given the market structure of the R&D
and FO sectors in equilibrium, factor prices are equalised across these sectors such that wFO = wR&D and
PDFO = P
D
R&D, thus allowing us to define the optimal allocation of labour and private capital across the two
sectors as follows:
(− 1)

Y
θL
= v
J
(1− θ)L (6)
and
(− 1)

Y
φK
= v
J
(1− φ)K . (7)
2.4 Representative household behaviour and optimality conditions
To complete the model, we introduce representative household behaviour and assume that at any point in
time, the representative household will supply one unit of labour and maximise its intertemporal utility by
controlling for private consumption per capita. Given a CRRA instantaneous utility function, the overall
utility maximised by the representative household is:
U(c) =
c1−σ − 1
1− σ e
−ρt, (8)
where c = C/L is per capita consumption, ρ is the intertemporal discount rate, and σ is the inverse of the in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution, such that high values of σ imply more uniform intertemporal consumer
behaviour. Moreover, given the identified structure of the three different sectors composing the economy,
we can rewrite the private capital accumulation function, constraining the decisions of the representative
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household as:
K˙ = rK + wL+Api − vA˙− C. (9)
Given the structure of the utility of the representative household and the private capital accumulation
function, we can derive the market solution for the model, which differs from the social planner solution
(see Eicher and Turnovsky, 1999) in terms of the balanced growth rate (Steger, 2005a; Steger, 2005b),
but not in terms of the long-run growth rate. This means that the centralised (social planner) solution
is superior to the decentralised (market) solution in terms of welfare. The gap between the two solutions
depends on the monopolistic competition structure of the CG sector, on the negative externalities linked to
institutional quality, and on the positive spillovers due to network relationships. Public policies that reduce
these distortions may raise the level of the balanced growth path, even if they cannot modify the long-run
growth rate.
Hence, by solving the household intertemporal optimisation process using Equations (8) and (9) with
K(0) > 0 and A(0) > 0) and applying the Ramsey-Keynes rule of optimal consumption8, we obtain:
γ =
C˙
C
=
1
σ
[r − ρ− (1− σ)n] , (10)
which states that when the real interest rate is equal to the intertemporal discount rate, it is optimal to
maintain consumption at a constant level. Further, the solution to the household optimisation problem leads
to identification of the dynamic system that drives all sectors of the economy, defined by Equations (3), (4)
and (5), and the allocations of inputs (6) and (7). The dynamic system thus derived serves as the basis
for the analysis of transitional dynamics. The general stability properties can be analysed and the speed of
convergence determined. For this purpose, we need to derive the balanced growth path9. As is standard in
the literature, we simplify the model by employing an auxiliary assumption whereby Y˙ /Y = K˙/K, which
states that by dividing Equation (3) by K, we have Y˙ /Y = K˙/K = C˙/C on the balanced growth path.
Hence, we can unequivocally determine K˙/K and A˙/A, which are given by10:
K˙
K
= βKn, where βK =
σL(1− ηA) + ηLσA
(1− σK)(1− ηA)− ηKσA (11)
A˙
A
= βAn, where βA =
ηL(1− σK) + ηKσL
(1− σK)(1− ηA)− ηKσA . (12)
Following Eicher and Turnovsky (1999), using Equations (11) and (12) enables us to determine the
conditions for positive and balanced growth by applying the social planner solution to a general R&D-
based growth model. The result is equally applicable here, because the underlying production function and
the resulting balanced growth rates are structurally identical for the decentralised and centralised solutions
(Steger, 2005b). Accordingly, (1−σK)(1−ηA)−ηKσA > 0 and σK < 1 are necessary and sufficient conditions
for positive growth. In addition, there are three conditions related to the production function: (i) constant
returns to scale; (ii) a condition of the Cobb-Douglas type; (iii) homogeneous separability in exogenously
8Because we need to obtain the growth rate of private consumption in terms other than per-capita, we calculate the first
difference of c over time and obtain
˙
c =
(C˙L−CL˙)
LC
= γ − n, where γ is the growth rate of private consumption.
9As is normal, the balanced growth path is defined by the constant (possibly different) growth rates of the endogenous
variables. This definition implies that the allocation variables (θ and φ) must be constant along the balanced growth path.
10The balanced growth rates of K and A can be derived from d[Y/K]/dt = 0 and d[J/A]/dt = 0 by noting that, on the
balanced growth path, the allocation variables (θ and φ) are constant, and that L˙/L = n.
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Figure 1: Basic model simulation results
(a) Technology shock, different institutional quality levels (b) Private capital shock, different institutional quality levels
Notes: Figures 1a and 1b use parameters extracted from studies by Steger (2005a; 2005b). We have σA = 0.3, σL = 0.64, σK =
0.36, ηSOA = 0.06, η
P
L = 0.64, η
P
K = 0.36, η
e
L = 0.2, η
e
K = 0.2, ρ = 0.05, Σ = 1, n = 0.15, unetint = 0, ucomp = 0.The broken line
maintains all of the parameters at fixed levels except for ηeL = 0.15, η
e
K = 0.15. The figures are obtained by setting steady-state values
of 600 for private consumption and private capital, a steady-state value of 900 for technology, the price of blueprints to 3, and the share
of labour and capital goods in the research and development sector to 0.09.
and endogenously growing factors. The model shows even growth (K˙/K = A˙/A) in the first and third cases
and uneven growth (K˙/K 6= A˙/A ) in the second case. Provided one of the preceding conditions for balanced
growth applies, the balanced growth rates can be written as Y˙ /Y = K˙/K = C˙/C = βKn and A˙A = βAn.
Moreover, as is clear from the equations, the balanced growth rates are crucially determined by the
structural characteristics of the technology side of the model given by the elasticities of the factors of
production in FO and R&D. Given that ηA = ηSOA + (1− ηK) and ηL = ηPL + ηeL, ηK = ηPK + ηeK , this implies
that the negative externalities produced by low institutional quality and associated with private capital and
labour, and the influence of network relationships on the accumulation of technology, structurally affect the
balanced growth path. Furthermore, growth is characterised by the absence of a scale effect, i.e. growth is
independent of the size of the economy, and the balanced growth rates are proportional to the growth rate
of the exogenously growing factor (labour).
2.5 Simulations of the basic model
Given the dynamic system described by Equations (3), (4), (5) and(10), the two static allocations constraints
(6) and (7), and rescaling the main variables using Equations (11) and (12), we obtain a comprehensive frame-
work that can be used in simulation analysis (Trimborn et al., 2008). The aim of the analysis described here
is to show that shocks to the technology and private capital affect the growth rates of private consumption,
private capital and technology through the allocation of human and physical capital between the R&D and
final output sectors and variations in blueprint prices, and that differences in institutional quality (as defined
in subsection 2.3) influence the effects of these shocks.
Figure 1 reports the main outcomes from a simulation analysis of the effects of a symmetric shock to
the technology growth rate (Panel a) and private capital (Panel b). All of the figures are obtained by
setting steady-state values of 600 for private consumption and private capital, a steady-state value of 900
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for technology, the price of blueprints to 3, and the shares of labour and capital goods in the research and
development sector to 0.09. The parameters are in line with those adopted by Steger (2005a; 2005b). The
solid line in each figure describes a value of 0.02 for ηeK and η
e
L, and the broken line sets these parameters to
0.015. All of the figures report the effect of the shock on blueprint prices and on human and physical capital,
which represent the main channels through which the shock spreads within the three different sectors of the
economy described.
Given these parameters, Figure 1a shows that a 1% shock to technology A increases private capital and
consumption, and that this shock influences these variables through the allocation constraints (6) and (7) and
the variability of blueprint prices. The shock is not permanent, but is strongly persistent over time, because
an increase in A has a positive influence on the number of intermediate goods varieties, which also influences
private capital. When there is a symmetrical decrease in ηeK and η
e
L (represented by a shift from continuous
to dotted lines), all of the impulse responses are persistently differently shaped from their previous states.
This result depends on variations in ηeK and η
e
L jointly influencing the behaviour of private and human
capital and technology (ηA = ηSOA + (1− ηK). In line with the identification of the negative externalities
ηeK and η
e
L with constraints related to low institutional quality in the country, this outcome predicts that
a shock has different short-run effects on A depending on the institutional framework of the economy in
question. Moreover, Figure 1a shows that a symmetrical decrease in ηeK and η
e
L alters the effect of the shock
on blueprint prices, which generates a permanent change in returns gained from the realisation of a new idea.
Although they are less pronounced, the results reported in Figure 1a are still valid where a symmetrical 1%
shock to private capital is considered, as described by Figure 1b. Unlike in the previous case, examining
private capital we find that the effect of the shock dissipates more rapidly and that variations in technology
and private capital are less consistent. Where there is a symmetrical decrease in ηeK and η
e
L (represented
by a shift from continuous to dotted lines), there is a permanent change in the temporal behaviour of the
impulse responses, but this change is less evident than in the previous case.
In sum, these results show that i) impulses affecting technology have an effect on all of the variables
considered; ii) changes in institutional quality condition the transitional dynamics of the economic system
and the balanced growth path; and iii) the effects of institutional quality permanently alter the level of
impulse responses.
2.6 Simulations of the model introducing market failure
To complete the simulation analysis, we follow Steger (2005a; 2005b) by introducing into the dynamic
system Equations (3), (4), (5) and (10) two market imperfections concerning the presence of monopolistic
competition regime in the CG sector (ucomp) and the positive external effect associated with technological
knowledge defined as network interaction spillovers unetint. Because these market imperfections act on the
allocation constraints (6) and (7) by controlling for them, we can identify the effects of ηeK and η
e
L more
precisely. To address this task, we use the same simulation structure as that employed in the previous
subsection, and first impose a shift of 0.001 in ucomp, followed by a shift in unetint from 0 to 0.001, 0.002 and
0.003. The solid lines indicates the absence of market failure, whereas the dotted lines indicate increasing
market failures.
10
Figure 2: Results of simulations of the basic model with market failure
(a) Technology shock, differences in market power (b) Technology shock, differences in network interactions
(c) Private capital shock, differences in market power (d) Private capital shock, differences in network interactions
Notes: Figures 2a, 2b, 2c and 2d use parameters extracted from studies by Steger (2005a; 2005b). We have σA = 0.3, σL = 0.64, σK =
0.36, ηSOA = 0.06, η
P
L = 0.64, η
P
K = 0.36, η
e
L = 0.2, η
e
K = 0.2, ρ = 0.05, Σ = 1, n = 0.15, unetint = 0, ucomp = 0.The broken lines in
Figures 2a and 2c maintain all of the parameters at fixed levels, except 0 ≥ unetint ≥ 0.03. The broken lines in Figures 2b and 2d
maintain all of the parameters at fixed levels, except ucomp = 0.01 . The figures are obtained by setting steady-state values of 600
for private consumption and private capital, a steady-state value of 900 for technology, the price of blueprints to 3, and the shares of
labour and capital goods in the research and development sector to 0.09.
Figure 2 reports the outcomes of a shock to technology (Panels a and b) and a shock to private capital
(Panels c and d), respectively, taking account of the influences of the monopolistic competition regime in the
CG sector and network interaction spillovers. The figure shows that differences in ucomp and unetint mask
the effects of ηeK and η
e
L. In particular, we note that an increase in market power in the CG sector reduces
the magnitude of the shift due to an exogenous shock to technology (Panel a), whereas there is no significant
effect when private capital is considered (Panel c). The effect involves blueprint prices, which rise after a
shock to technology. The effect increases with the values of market power in the CG sector.
The opposite effect on market power in the CG sector is shown by Panels b and d of Figure 2, where
network interaction spillovers are considered. As expected, higher levels of unetint increase the effects of
exogenous shocks on A and K. Moreover, the effects of network interaction spillovers are similar to a
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decrease in ηeK and η
e
L (Figure 1), as they increase private consumption and private and human capital,
and unlike in the previous case, increase blueprint prices instead of reducing them. The influence of such
market imperfections on the allocation variables do not appear to be significant. These results support
our intuitions: first, increased competition and new firms entering the market spur innovation (Aghion et
al. 2004; Griffith, Harrison and Macartney, 2007); second, network relationships stimulate the diffusion of
knowledge (Akçomak and ter Weel, 2009; Rost, 2011; Sabatini, 2099a; Sabatini, 2009b).
2.7 Empirical model specification
Estimating the dynamic system (Equations (2), (3), (4) and (5) under static allocation constraints (6) and (7)
given the steady-state values defined by conditions (11) and (12) is not a simple task. Because institutional
quality constrains the accumulation of new technology and impedes the growth of returns to scale, our
model belongs to the AK family and the estimation strategy has to account for recent contributions to the
estimation of AK models summarised by Bond et al. (2010). Following the outline proposed by Bond et al.
(2010), the simplest way to represent an AK model is as follows:
γcit = α1γ
c
t−1 + β∆xit + ζxit−1 + et + fi + ∆it (13)
where γit is the growth rate of per-capita GDP (as a proxy for the per-capita private consumption growth
rate) and xit is a vector that follows conditions (11) and (12) in determining the country-specific steady-state
growth rate. The first difference expression of this model formulation is obtained by assuming that the level
formulation of Equation (13) contains a non-stationary process cit that in the first difference is equal to
∆cit = θ0 + θ1xit−1 + uit. Moreover, unlike the model of Bond et al. (2010) described in subsection 2.4,
private capital and consumption along the balanced growth path grow at a constant rate equal to βKn in
the proposed model, whereas the long-run growth rate of technology along the balanced growth path is βAn.
This means that in this case, the vector xit and its lagged value xit−1 account for both these conditions, such
that xi,t, xi,t−1 = [K,A]. Further, in line with steady-state conditions (11) and (12), the inclusion of xit−1
takes into account that past values of private capital and technology predict a more rapid long-run growth
and that positive and significant parameters ζ associated with xit−1 allow for the presence of endogenous
growth (Bond et al., 2010). In addition, et is the time fixed effect and it is the error term. Because (13) is
expressed in the first difference, the country-specific fixed effect drops out of the model.
Proceeding with the model outline, if we consider the steady-state in which xit = xi and remember that
output per worker grows at the country-specific rate gi, we obtain
gi =
et
1− α +
(
ζ
1− α
)
xi, (14)
where the formulation accounts for heterogeneous steady-state growth rates that increase with the share of
private capital and the level of technology with respect to total output. When the parameter vector ζ > 0,
this hypothesis is validated. The inclusion of the steady-state path in Equation (13) allows us to identify
the estimated parameters without omitted variable bias. Bond et al. (2010) estimate a simple formulation
of Equation (13) by using instrumental variables to reduce the presence of serial correlation between lagged
values of the dependent variable and the error term. We adopt a similar approach by using an IV estimator
with an instrument matrix dated t− 2 and earlier to allow for the expected MA(1) error structure in these
first-differenced model specifications. Specifically, we use lagged observations from t− 2 to t− 6 on the per-
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capita GDP growth rate, on the growth rates of private capital and technology and on the lagged values of
the last two variables by level and lagged observations dated t−2 and t−3 on a set of additional instruments
(trade as a share of GDP and government spending as a share of GDP). Following this outline, Equation
(13) is estimated by an ADL(p,q) model specified as:
γcit = α1γ
c
t−1 + ...+ αpγ
c
t−p + β1∆xit + ...+ βq∆xit−q + ζ1xit−1 + ...+ ζqxit−q + dt + qi + δit, (15)
where dt is the time-specific idiosyncratic term, δit is the error term, and xit is again a vector defined as
xit = [K, A]. The parameters estimated by Equation (15) are used to measure the long-run elasticities of
private capital and technology with respect to per-capita GDP growth rate (called the long-run elasticity
- level effect), which is given by g¯Li =
ζ1+....+ζp
1−α1−...−αp
x¯i
γ¯c
i
, where x¯i is a interquartile mean vector including
investment in private capital and technology and γ¯ci is an interquartile mean vector of the per-capita GDP
growth rate for each country i. This elasticity measure describes the initial steady-state level for each country,
and where we use aggregated interquartile mean values for private capital, technology and the GDP growth
rate, it describes the overall steady-state in the whole sample. In addition to this gauge of elasticity, we also
calculate a long-run elasticity measure that accounts for the slope of the balanced growth path (called the
long-run elasticity - growth effect). Similarly to the previous measure, this measure of elasticity is defined
by g¯Gi =
β1+....+βp
1−α1−...−αp
x¯i
γ¯c
i
.
To complete the empirical framework, after estimating the responses to private capital and technology
shocks, we analyse how the of institutional variables (which identify the negative externalities ηeK and η
e
L)
disseminate these effects. We do so by estimating three auxiliary regressions that account for the direct
influence of institutional variables on private capital, technology and per-capita GDP growth. It should be
noted that because these equations account for short-run relationships only, we restrict the period of analysis.
This means that we need in each specification to account for the long-run growth elasticities estimated in
Equation (15). To accomplish this task, we include in each equation a set of specific time trends (d_g¯it) with
values that grow according to g¯Gi . For example, if we find that the balanced growth rate for a given country
is 1.2, our specific country trend will be obtained by multiplying the specific linear trend by 1.2. Further,
remembering that along the balanced growth path, private capital and consumption grow at a constant rate
equal to βKn, and that the long-run growth rate of technology along the balanced growth path is βAn, we
include country-specific time trends linked to private capital (d_g¯Gki ) in the first and third regressions and
country dummy variables linked to technology (d_g¯Gai ) in the second. We specify the following auxiliary
regressions:
γait = a21γ
a
t−1 + d21∆zit + d_g¯
Ga
i + ∆φit (16)
γkit = a11γ
k
1t−1 + d11∆zit + d_g¯
Gk
i i + ∆µit (17)
γcit = a31γ
c + d31∆zit + d_g¯Gki + ∆ψit. (18)
where γkit, γait and γcit describe the growth rates of private capital, technology and per-capita GDP and zit
is a vector of institutional variables defined in section 3. It should be noted in particular, that the vector
includes voice and accountability, government effectiveness, control of corruption, rule of law, the GINI index
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of income distribution, and the intensity of gas emissions. Furthermore, all of the specified equations include
error terms (∆µit, ∆φit and ∆ψit). In line with the model defined in Equation (15), the last three equations
are estimated by an ADL(p,q) model under an IV estimator.
The parameters estimated from Equations (16), (17) and (18) are used to formulate short-run elasticity
measures to compare the effects of institutional factors on the main variables of the model. As an example,
the short-run elasticity of each institutional variable on private capital is given by:
eγk
it
= d11
γ¯k
γ¯c
. (19)
3 Data, variables and empirical issues
This section provides a detailed description of the variables and sources of data used to estimate Equations
(15), (16), (17) and (18). The empirical analysis is based on two different period for a set of 15 European
countries. The set of countries examined, along with descriptive statistics for each variable, are reported in
Appendix A. Data covering the 1960-2010 period are used to estimate the steady-state country level (15),
while data covering the 1996-2010 period are used to estimate Equations (16), (17) and (18) and to identify
the negative externality linked to low institutional quality.
We use two different data sources to identify the main economic variables of Equation (15). The first
is the Penn World Table dataset edited annually by the University of Pennsylvania. This dataset contains
information on per-capita GDP growth rate at constant prices in chained series (and the corresponding
per-capita growth rates) and on private capital. From this source, we extract the per-capita GDP growth
rate used as a proxy for γcit and the ratio of investment in physical capital to GDP used to measure both the
growth rate of private capital γkit and the share of private capital in GDP xit in Equation (15). To account
for the technology growth rate γait and the technology level at−1, we collect data from the AMECO database,
which is redacted yearly by the Statistical Office of the European Commission. From this database, we
extrapolate the annual contribution of technology to total factor productivity at constant 2000 prices.
As far as formal institutions are concerned, several indicators of institutional quality in the countries of
interest are available from the literature (Carmignani, 2006). This analysis focuses on the quality of insti-
tutions in European countries to assess whether their political and economic institutions can be considered
inclusive or extractive. As a guide for selection of the relevant indicators, we use a set of variables strictly
related to the Europe 2020 growth strategy, which is aimed at strengthening inclusiveness and sustainable
development. Thus, our empirical investigation contributes to the current debate on the growth strategy
adopted by EU countries. We consider a set of variables related to the capacity of institutions to promote
good governance, social inclusion and environmental sustainability, the main targets of the Europe 2020
growth strategy.
At a greater level of detail, we consider four different variables reflecting the characteristics of the political
system (voice and accountability) and quality of governance (government effectiveness, control of corruption
and the rule of law) (Charron, Dykstra and Lapuente, 2012; Fagerberg and Srholec, 2008). These variables
are extracted from the Worldwide Governance Indicators provided by the World Bank. The WGIs bring
together and summarise information from 30 existing data sources that report the views and experiences of
citizens, entrepreneurs, and experts in the public, private and NGO sectors around the world on the quality
of various aspects of governance. They draw on four different types of data source: surveys of households
and firms (composed of data sources including the Afro-barometer survey, the Gallup World Poll, and the
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Global Competitiveness Report Survey), commercial business information providers (comprising data sources
including the Economist Intelligence Unit, Global Insight and Political Risk Services), non-governmental
organisations (made up of data sources including Global Integrity, Freedom House and Reporters Without
Borders), and public sector organisations (composed of data sources including CPIA assessments of the
World Bank and regional development banks, the EBRD Transition Report and the French Ministry of
Finance Institutional Profiles Database). From these data sources we first extract data on the voice and
accountability variable, which captures perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to
participate in selecting their government, and of freedom of expression, freedom of association and a free
media. Second, we draw observations on government effectiveness, a variable that captures perceptions of
the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political
pressure, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s
commitment to such policies. The third type of data we extract comprises perceptions of the extent to
which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well
as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests, which is used as a proxy for the control of corruption.
In contrast, the rule of law variable captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in
and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the
police and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
To these variables, we add two more indicators that reflect, with respect to other dimensions, whether the
government is inclusive or extractive: the social and environmental sustainability of institutions. By taking
account of social sustainability, we emphasise the literature that investigates the link between institutions and
income distribution. Bad institutions increase income inequality because higher-income groups cope better
with institutional inefficiencies than do lower-income groups (Carmignani, 2006). Moreover, high-quality
institutions reduce income inequality by inducing non-educated workers to invest in education, thus fostering
human capital accumulation (Dias and Tebaldi, 2012). We follow these analyses by adopting the GINI index
of income distribution in purchasing power parity constant terms in year 2005 as a proxy of the social
sustainability of institutions. Furthermore, according to the targets defined by the Europe 2020 strategy, we
employ variations in energy intensity as a proxy capturing the degree of environmental sustainability assured
by the institutional context. These observations are extracted from the Human Development Report redacted
yearly by the United Nations.
In addition to these indicators, we collect observations for variables accounting for the market imperfection
controls that emerge in the model. The first control, which is linked to the competitiveness of the domestic
economy, is measured by the Economic Freedom of the World Index. This index published by the Economic
Freedom of the World (EFW) is designed to measure a country’s institutions and policies on a comparative
basis. The key ingredients of this index are based on objective components (for example, government
consumption as a share of total consumption, or transfers and subsidies as a share of GDP) collected from
external sources including the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Economic
Forum, as well as data based on surveys, expert panels and case studies. The scores for these variables are
categorised into five main areas of economic freedom: i) size of government; ii) legal structure and security
of property rights; iii) access to finance and sound money; iv) freedom to trade internationally; and v)
regulation of credit, labour and business. The final score for the aggregate EFW index, which ranges from
1 to 10, where 10 represents the maximum degree of economic freedom, is obtained as the mean value of
these components. This indicator is thus related to various aspects of the competitiveness and functioning
of markets resulting from political decision-making.
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Table 1: Levin-Lin-Chu and Im-Pesaran-Shin tests for unit-root in heterogeneous panels
Levin-Lin-Chu Levin-Lin-Chu Im-Pesaran-Shin Im-Pesaran-Shin
with trend with trend
at−1 -3.644 -3.697 2.013 4.838
(0.037) (1.000) (0.978) (1.000)
hp_at−1 -8.521 -3.114
(0.999) (0.000)
kt−1 -9.543 -11.287 -3.979 -2.922
(0.012) (0.057) (0.000) (0.002)
γc -8.402 -9.412 -2.800 -1.792
(1.000) (1.000) (0.0039) (0.037)
γa -8.182 -11.667 -3.175 -3.957
(1.000) (1.000) (0.001) 0.000)
γk -8.402 -9.412 -2.800 -1.792
(1.000) (1.000) (0.003) (0.037)
Notes:The first two columns report Levin-Lin-Chu test statistics (Levin et al., 2002) with and without a linear
trend, whereas the last two columns report Im-Pesaran-Shin test statistic (Im et al., 2003) with the same
specification. The number of lags used in the test statistics is three. The null hypothesis in the Levin-Lin-Chu
test statistic is the absence of a unit-root in the series, whereas the null hypothesis in the Im-Pesaran-Shin
test statistic allows for the presence of a unit-root in the series.
In addition, to incorporate the second market imperfection control into the model, we identify network
interaction spillovers as a measure of overall trust. As is common in the literature (Dearmon and Grier,
2011; Knack and Keefer, 1997), we measure trust by responses to question from the World Values Survey
dataset (European Values Study Group and World Values Association, 2006): “Generally speaking, would
you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” In most of
the literature (Tabellini, 2010; Zak and Knack, 2001; Charron and Lapuente, 2012), this variable is used to
capture different cultural values (generalised trust) that affect the informal rules of the game, the functioning
of formal institutions and differences in economic performance.
These last two measures accounting for market imperfection, are used to set two dummy variables with
values equal to one when the level of economic freedom and the level of overall trust in a country, respectively,
are higher that the interquartile mean of the full sample analysied over the 1996-2010 period. These two
dummy variables are then used to divide the full-sample into four sub-samples defined as: i) high trust;
ii) low trust; iii) high competition; and iv) low competition. Appendix A reports the countries in each
sub-sample.
4 Results
This section provides an extensive overview of the results obtained by following the estimation strategy
outlined in subsection 2.7. The analysis is based on a sample of EU-15 countries and uses two different
data ranges: a longer period (from 1970 to 2010) is used to estimate the long-run relationship described in
Equation (15), and a shorter period is used to estimate Equations (16), (17), (18).
As a preliminary analysis, Table 1 reports the Levin-Lin-Chu (Levin et al., 2002) and Im-Pesaran-Shin
(Im et al., 2003) unit-root test statistics for all of the main variables included in the long-run regression,
specified with and without a linear trend. The second test statistic may be more powerful for heterogeneous
panels because it is based on an appropriately standardised average of the individual augmented Dickey-
Fuller test, and has a standard normal limiting distribution. In more detail, the Levin-Lin-Chu test statistics
has as its null hypothesis the absence of a unit-root in the series, whereas the presence of a unit-root in the
series is the null hypothesis in the Im-Pesaran-Shin test statistic. In line with the Equation (15), we conduct
the tests on both the level and the first difference of private capital and technology and on the growth
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Table 2: Baseline specifications: pooled results in first differences
Full-sample Full-sample High network Low network High competition Low competition
interaction interaction
sub-sample sub-sample sub-sample sub-sample
γc
it−1 0.488 *** 0.593 *** 0.996 *** 0.439 *** 1.229 *** 0.322 ***
(0.152) (0.111) (0.085) (0.149) (0.119) (0.123)
γc
it−2 0.077 * 0.052 * -0.049 -0.013 -0.317 *** 0.216 ***
(0.054) (0.039) (0.067) (0.047) (0.062) (0.057)
γc
it−3 0.085 * -0.064 * 0.245 *** 0.031 0.133 *
(0.058) (0.037) (0.056) (0.051) (0.074)
γk
it
0.108 *** 0.102 *** 0.131 *** 0.048 ** -0.033 0.100 ***
(0.024) (0.022) (0.024) (0.025) (0.028) (0.022)
γk
it−1 -0.019 -0.030 * -0.122 *** -0.000 0.003 -0.027 *
(0.017) (0.017) (0.011) (0.008) (0.015) (0.017)
γk
it−2 0.004 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.025 **
(0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013)
γk
it−3 -0.016 *** -0.036 *** -0.010 * -0.024 *** -0.022 ***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
γa
it
0.846 *** 0.875 *** 0.500 *** 1.000 *** 1.290 *** 0.726 ***
(0.087) (0.090) (0.075) (0.119) (0.103) (0.095)
γa
it−1 -0.326 *** -0.417 *** -0.551 *** -0.365 *** -1.199 *** -0.157 *
(0.122) (0.087) (0.073) (0.161) (0.129) (0.089)
γa
it−2 -0.030 -0.009 0.096 ** 0.051 0.350 *** -0.071 *
(0.058) (0.054) (0.044) (0.045) (0.076) (0.048)
γa
it−3 -0.015 0.078 * -0.177 *** -0.143 *** -0.002
( 0.051) (0.055) (0.052) (0.065) (0.067)
kit−1 0.025 *** 0.025 *** 0.021 ** 0.019 * 0.003 0.002
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.011) (0.021)
hp_ait−1 0.079 *** 0.095 *** -0.042 0.098 *** 0.118 *** 0.031
(0.036) (0.039) (0.035) (0.033) (0.033) (0.057)
Time fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Long-run elasticity
growth effect private capital 0.025 0.025 0.004 0.020 0.007 0.021
Long-run elasticity
level effect private capital 0.692 0.697 3.045 0.590 - -
Long-run elasticity
growth effect technology 0.726 0.679 1.00 0.752 1.868 0.730
Long-run elasticity
level effect technology 0.117 0.141 - 0.160 0.740 -
Hansen J test 10.098 10.517 8.162 9.154 10.129 10.381
0.607 0.651 0.772 0.690 0.605 0.583
Log-likelihood -613.970 -630.682 -233.069 -351.247 -322.153 -284.234
Number of observations 450 450 180 270 240 210
Notes: The dependent variable is the growth rate of per-capita GDP. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance
at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are used across all reported estimates.
The set of instrumental variables common to all specifications are dated t−2 and earlier to allow for the MA(1) error structure in these first-differenced
model specifications. In more detail, we use lagged observations dated to t − 2 on t − 6 of the log value of per-capita GDP and the share of private
capital in GDP and technology, and employ lagged observations dated t − 2 and t − 3 on a set of additional instruments (trade as a share of GDP
and government spending as a share of GDP). The instrumental variables are the first lag of the growth rate of per-capita GDP and the levels and
first differences of the shares of private capital and technology. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are used across all
reported estimates.
rate of per-capita GDP. A comparison of these test statistics shows that the share of private capital in
GDP rejects the null-hypothesis of stationarity when Levin-Lin-Chu test statistics without a linear trend are
considered, whereas the unit-root hypothesis is rejected by the Im-Pesaran-Shin test statistics in both the
specification with and the specification without a linear trend. In contrast, the unit-root hypothesis is not
rejected by Im-Pesaran-Shin test statistics when technology is considered. However, to maintain coherence
with specification (15), instead of first differencing this variable, we use a standard Hodrick–Prescott filter
to extract the linear trend from the series, then use only the residual component in the long-run estimations:
hp_ait−1. As confirmed by the statistics reported in Table 1, this new variable is stationary.
Table 2 reports estimates of our baseline specification of the long-run growth rate of GDP based on
Equation (15) in which time fixed effects are included. The set of instrumental variables common to all of
the specifications are dated t− 2 and earlier to allow for the MA(1) error structure in these first-differenced
model specifications. In more detail, we use lagged observations dated t − 2 to t − 6 on the log value of
per-capita GDP and the share of private capital in GDP and technology, and employ lagged observations
dated t−2 and t−3 on a set of additional instruments (trade as a share of GDP and government spending as
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a share of GDP). The instrumental variables are the first lag of the growth rate of per-capita GDP γcit−1 and
the levels and first differences of the shares of private capital (kit−1, γkit) and technology (hp_ait−1, γait−1).
The instruments chosen in line with Bond et al. (2010) are validated by the Sargan-Hansen test statistics.
Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are used across all of the reported estimates
(see Cushing and McGarvey, 1999 for a discussion).
The first column of Table 2 reports the results for a general dynamic specification with up to three
lags, and the second column excludes one lag from all of the variables. The next two columns report
estimates for the high/low network interaction sub-samples, and the last two columns show estimates for
the high/low market competition sub-samples. Long- and short run elasticity measures are reported for
each specification at the bottom of the table. The IV estimates produced by our general dynamic model
largely suggest that private capital and technology exert significantly positive long-run effects on both the
slope and the level of the long-run growth path of GDP, although the effect of the share of private capital
is not significant when we distinguish between the low and high competition sub-samples. The effect of
technology remains insignificant in the high network interaction and low market competition sub-samples.
The long-run parameters are quite stable along specifications ranging between 0.019 and 0.025 for kit−1 and
between 0.079 and 0.118 for hp_ait−1. As expected, the range of parameters for kit−1 is higher than that
estimated by Bond et al. (2010), who find parameters ranging between 0.0075 and 0.0189 for the same
variable. However, our analysis does not account for lower income countries, and it uses a different sample
period to that examined by Bond et al. (2010). Unlike the analysis of Bond et al. (2010), the exclusion of
one lag value for each variable (column II) does not change the main results.
These pooled estimates produced by our model suggest that increasing the share of private capital or
technology has a quantitatively and statistically significant effect on the long-run growth rate of GDP. In
particular, when measuring long-run elasticity a permanent 1% increases in technology predicts an upward
shift of about 0.11% in the long-run growth path, whereas the same variation in the private capital share
predicts a slope variation of about 0.69 %. The values of the elasticity measures vary, especially among
the high network interaction sub-sample, in which a permanent 1% increase in the share of private capital
predicts a 3% jump in the long run growth path, while an upward shift of only 0.59% is found among the
low network interaction sub-sample. In results opposite to those for the share of private capital, we find
that the primary effect of a change in technology is on the slope, rather than the level, of the long-run
growth path. Indeed, a 1% increase in long-run elasticity associated with the growth effect of technology
lifts the slope of the long-run growth path by about 0.7%, with the magnitude of the upward shift increasing
among the high network interaction (1%) and high market competition (1.86%) sub-samples. In line with
the simulation results presented in subsections 2.5 and 2.6, we find that variations in technology (long-run
elasticity - growth effect of technology) produce higher variations in the GDP growth rate than do variation
of the same magnitude in the share of private capital. Moreover, in line with our theoretical framework,
policies that improve network interactions and market competition result in considerable changes in elasticity
measures.
Proceeding with the outline described in subsection 2.7, Table 3 reports the estimation results for the dy-
namic equation of the technology growth rate described in (16). The reported specifications use the same set
of instruments as those described before and standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
(Cushing and McGarvey, 1999). Moreover, the use of one lag for the endogenous variable γait−1 according
with the Ackaike and Schwarz information criteria (not reported), and is avoided by employing the residual
serial correlation LM test, which accepts the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the residuals for all
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Table 3: Pooled results for the regression of inclusive institutions on technology growth
I II III IV V VI
γa
t−1 0.403 *** 0.436 *** 0.410 *** 0.426 *** 0.488 *** 0.519 ***
(0.049) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.044) (0.051)
Voice and accountability 0.072 ***
(0.013)
Government effectiveness 0.046 ***
(0.008)
Control of corruption 0.046 ***
(0.007)
Rule of law 0.055 ***
(0.010)
GINI index 0.016 **
(0.007)
Variance in energy intensity -0.011 *
(0.008)
Technology fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Short-run elasticity
Full-sample 1.125 0.906 0.895 0.977 0.462 -0.025
Short-run elasticity
High network interaction 0.649 0.678 0.684 0.471 -0.014 -
Short-run elasticity
Low network interaction 1.292 1.047 1.014 1.020 1.064 -0.050
Short-run elasticity
High competition 1.084 0.875 0.903 0.931 0.718 -0.041
Short-run elasticity
Low competition 0.826 0.697 0.616 0.716 0.577 -
Hansen J test 15.766 15.665 15.585 15.622 15.478 15.129
0.609 0.616 0.621 0.619 0.629 0.653
Log-likelihood -624.705 -627.011 -625.698 -626.783 -625.075 -560.782
Number of observations 315 315 315 315 311 279
Notes: The dependent variable is the growth rate of technology. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the
0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are used across all reported estimates.The set
of instrumental variables common to all specifications are dated t − 2 and earlier to allow for the MA(1) error structure in these first-differenced model
specifications. In more detail, we use lagged observations dated to t − 2 on t − 6 of the log value of per-capita GDP and the share of private capital in
GDP and technology, and employ lagged observations dated t − 2 and t − 3 on a set of additional instruments (trade as a share of GDP and government
spending as a share of GDP). The instrumental variables are the first lag of the growth rate of per-capita GDP and the levels and first differences of the
shares of private capital and technology. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are used across all reported estimates.
specification (not reported). The six columns of Table 3 report the results for specifications respectively
including the sequential addition of each of the identified variables, describing low levels of institutional
quality that reflect the theoretical outline in accounting for the negative externality ηe. In greater detail, we
consider four variables measuring institutional factors: voice and accountability, government effectiveness,
control of corruption and the rule of law. We include the GINI index of income distribution to account for
social sustainability, and consider variations in energy intensity to gauge environmental sustainability. The
sequential inclusion of these variables crucially depends on strong correlations between the different identified
elements, which may bias the estimated parameters, and accordingly the elasticity measures reported after
the estimated parameters. Along with short-run elasticity measures for the full-sample analysis, we report
another four sets of measures obtained by replicating the analysis reported in Table 2 for each sub-sample.
Where the estimated parameters for each of the sub-samples are not statistically significant, we omit the
corresponding elasticity measure.
The first line of Table 3 accounting for voice and accountability reveals that the extent to which a country’s
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, freedom of expression, freedom of association
and a free media have the greatest effect on the growth rate of technology, with a coefficient of 0.072. This
empirical result is in line with the results of studies on the effect of political institutions on economic growth
(Knack and Keefer, 1997; Tabellini, 2010; Zak and Knack, 2001), and is consistent with the analyses of
relationships between good institutions, innovation and growth discussed in the previous section (Dias and
Tebaldi, 2012; Tebaldi and Elmslie, 2008, 2013). A similar consideration may also be applied when the rule
of law is taken into account. Efficient judicial institutions are crucial for innovation because they guarantee
the protection of property rights (Haggard and Tiede, 2011). Especially in the advanced world context, when
the cost of innovation increases, an efficient judicial system strengthens incentives for firms to make risky
19
investments in innovative products. The importance of the political institutions and quality of governance
described by these first two variables is also evidenced by the short-run elasticity measures reported in the
middle of the table. The first column demonstrates that a 1% variation in voice and accountability lifts
technology growth rate by about 1.12%, with a maximum value of 1.29% among the low network interaction
sub-sample. Moreover, a 1% increase in the rule of law increases the technological growth rate by about
0.97%, with a maximum value of about 1.02% in the low network interaction sub-sample. As expected, the
effects of these two variables are more important in the low trust and low competition sub-samples.
Continuing with the estimation outline presented in subsection 2.7, columns II and III report results for
the influence of corruption control and government effectiveness on the technology growth rate. Following
previous contributions to this field of research (d’Agostino et al., 2012; Pieroni and d’Agostino, 2013), the
control of corruption variable captures the political dimension of corruption, and is more strongly linked to
political power, whereas government effectiveness may also be seen as a proxy for the bureaucratic dimension
of corruption, having a greater link to the effectiveness of services provided by government to firms and
citizens. On this basis, the positive influence these variables appear to exert the less advanced economies.
Nonetheless, despite the lower levels of corruption perceived in EU-15 countries, our estimates suggest that
corruption is also an issue relevant to highly developed countries, as it conditions their rates of technological
progress. This result is in line with the findings of Salinas-Jimenez and Salinas-Jimenez (2006). When short-
run elasticities are considered, we find that 1% variation in control of corruption or government effectiveness
produces about a 1% increase in technology growth, and that these effects are greater in the low network
interaction sub-sample.
The last two columns of Table 3 report estimation results for the GINI index of income distribution
and variations in energy intensity. The positive sign of the first variable (the parameter of the GINI index
is 0.016) could be seen as counterintuitive: following our hypothesis, inclusive institutions, which are also
those that provide for more equitable income distribution, positively affect technological progress. One
possible explanation for this finding concerns the reliability of the Gini coefficient measure, because our data
refer to gross inequality rather than ex post income inequality (i.e., income measured net of redistributive
public expenditure). However, even when we recognise this drawback due to the lack of available data,
we can reconcile the estimated result with our framework, considering that inventions are characterised
by a high degree of uncertainty and require the concentration of high-ability individuals and resources in
technologically advanced sectors (Banerjee and Duflo, 2003; Galor and Tsiddon, 1997). During the process of
diffused innovation across the overall economy, once new technologies become more accessible, the positive
relationship between inequality and technological change declines and disappears in the long-run. Our
estimate is thus in line with analyses showing that technological inventions produce co-movement between
technological progress and income inequality in the short run (Banerjee and Duflo, 2003; Galor and Tsiddon,
1997). This argument may explain why we find short-run elasticity in technology for the GINI index of about
0.40, whereas the positive influence of income inequality dissipates in estimates related to private capital
and GDP growth. Partial confirmation of this insight emerges when we consider high network interaction
sub-sample. In this case, the sign of the elasticity coefficient is reversed, and we find that a 1% increase in
the GINI index reduces technological growth. Because this sub-sample includes all countries where informal
rules create fertile ground for cooperation, particularly among small and medium firms, we can argue that
where income distribution is more equitable and generalised trust is high, the risks of innovative activities,
tacit knowledge and information are shared among firms connected by dense network relationships, thus
promoting innovation. In other words, when social cohesion is strong, cooperation spurs both inventions and
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Table 4: Pooled results for regression of inclusive institutions on private capital growth
I II III IV V VI
γk
t−1 0.756 *** 0.801 *** 0.767 *** 0.731 *** 0.704 *** 0.543 ***
(0.063) (0.066) (0.061) (0.058) (0.058) (0.060)
Voice and accountability 0.049
(0.037)
Government effectiveness 0.056 **
(0.030)
Control of corruption 0.036 *
(0.016)
Rule of law 0.017
(0.028)
GINI index -0.023 **
(0.012)
Variance in energy intensity -0.229 ***
(0.051)
Private capital fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Short-run elasticity
Full-sample - 2.272 1.444 - -1.444 -1.089
Short-run elasticity
High network interaction - - - - -5.571 -3.908
Short-run elasticity
Low network interaction - 3.077 2.543 - -2.209 -0.394
Short-run elasticity
High competition - - - - - -3.808
Short-run elasticity
Low competition 1.656 1.323 0.887 - - -0.559
Hansen J test 17.772 18.427 18.017 17.122 17.150 17.084
0.471 0.428 0.455 0.515 0.513 0.517
Kleibergen-Paap test 16.095 15.991 15.612 15.837 16.890 17.544
0.651 0.658 0.683 0.668 0.597 0.553
Log-likelihood -1000.118 -1004.553 -1001.226 -997.784 -981.662 -848.406
Number of observations 300 300 300 300 296 264
Notes: The dependent variable is the growth rate of private capital as a share of GDP. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and ***
represent significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are used across all
reported estimates.The set of instrumental variables common to all specifications are dated t − 2 and earlier to allow for the MA(1) error structure in
these first-differenced model specifications. In more detail, we use lagged observations dated to t− 2 on t− 6 of the log value of per-capita GDP and the
share of private capital in GDP and technology, and employ lagged observations dated t− 2 and t− 3 on a set of additional instruments (trade as a share
of GDP and government spending as a share of GDP). The instrumental variables are the first lag of the growth rate of per-capita GDP and the levels
and first differences of the shares of private capital and technology. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are used across all
reported estimates.
more rapid diffusion of innovations.
Our hypothesis on energy intensity is that inclusive institutions provide incentives for the adoption of
the best available technologies, particularly for those that are more environmentally friendly (Acemoglu et
al., 2012). Indirectly, this hypothesis is consistent with the Porter hypothesis, which states that properly
designed environmental regulation can stimulate innovation (Lanoie et al., 2011; Porter and van der Linde,
1995). Our empirical results confirm that nations that adopt a strategy of sustainable growth, proxied by
lower energy intensity variation, achieve more rapid technological change.
Table 4 presents the results for the dynamic equation of the growth rate of investment in physical capital
described in (17). The table is organised in the same manner as Table 3. The estimated results generally
show that when assessing growth in the share of private capital, not all characteristics of inclusive institutions
are statistically significant. Columns II and III demonstrate that control of corruption has a strong positive
influence (through either its political or bureaucratic dimension) whereas columns V and VI show that the
GINI index and energy intensity variation have strong negative effects. Taking voice and accountability
and the rule of law into account produces insignificant results. In greater depth, the short-run elasticity
measures (reported in the middle of the table), highlight some interesting findings. First, although 1%
increase in voice and accountability boosts private capital growth by about 1.6% when low competition
sub-sample is taken into account, the results for this variable are not significant in either the full-sample or
the other sub-samples. Second, similar to the elasticity results for technological growth, we find strongly
positive elasticities for corruption control and government effectiveness of 2.272% and 1.444% respectively.
This means that small variations in these variables may also result in significant variations in the growth
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rate of the share of private capital. Moreover, it demonstrates that government effectiveness in particular
conditions this growth rate. This result is not surprising, and is in line with findings reported in extensive
literature on the relationship between corruption and private capital, identifying the crowding-out effect of
corruption on private investment as one of the most important channels through which corruption spreads
into the economic system (Mauro, 1995; Mauro, 1996). The magnitude of our elasticity measures still grows
in the low network interaction sub-sample, showing that a 1% increase in government effectiveness raises
private capital share growth by about 3%, that the same size shock to corruption control lifts private capital
share growth by about by about 2.5%.
Moreover, greater inequality in income distribution and positive variations in energy intensity reduce the
rate of growth in the private capital share of GDP. Our findings that inequality has a negative influence
on investment and thus on economic growth is in line with that of García-Peñalosa and Wen (2008), who
argue that redistribution provides insurance to agents undertaking risky activities, which reduces income
uncertainty, thus inducing more entrepreneurship. This result also confirms the well-established relationship
between inequality and institutions: a robust body of literature establishes that the inequitable distribution
of resources creates rent-seeking policies and exploitative and inefficient economic institutions that stifle
entrepreneurship and growth (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001; Banerjee and Iyer, 2005; Engerman
and Sokoloff, 2005). As a consequence, reducing high levels of inequality is important in influencing the
quality of institutions to remove socio-institutional frictions that hinder investment and economic growth.
Returning to the estimation results, the short-run elasticities for the GINI index are up to three times greater
in the high network interaction sub-sample than in the full-sample, for which the measure is -1.444%. A
similar effect is found for variations in energy intensity: the short-run elasticity measures for energy intensity
variation in the high network interaction and high competition sub-samples are three times greater than those
in the full-sample analysis. Once again, these results show that the sub-samples chosen for this study are
crucial in giving a clear and comprehensive view of the link between private investment growth and inclusive
institutions.
As a final step to complete the outline described in subsection 2.7, Table 5 reports the estimates for
the per-capita GDP growth rate taking account of the six different variables linked to inclusive institutions.
As the table shows, all of the variables other than the GINI index of income distribution are statistically
significant with the expected signs. The GINI index has a significant direct effect only in the high network
interaction and high competition sub-samples. In these contexts, as shown by the short-run elasticity meas-
ures reported in the middle of the table, we find that income distribution becoming more unequal has a
negative effect on the per-capita GDP growth rate. A similar pattern appear when energy intensity vari-
ations are considered. In addition, where we find a significant effect in the full-sample analysis for energy
intensity variations, the short-run elasticity measures for the high network interaction and high competition
sub-samples are higher than those for the other two sub-samples. However, the opposite pattern emerges
when the institutional components are considered. Similar to the estimates obtained for technology, we find
that voice and accountability (column I) and the rule of law (column IV), as characteristics of the efficiency
of political and judicial powers, have highly significant effects on the economic growth rate. In particular,
the short-run elasticity measures shows that a 1% increase in voice and accountability lifts γct by about
0.60%, while the effect of a 1% variation in the rule of law is about 0.45%. This pattern in the elasticity
results becomes more pronounced when we consider countries with low network interactions. Furthermore,
they remain valid when control of corruption and government effectiveness are considered. We find strong
effects in this case, especially in countries with low network interactions. Moreover, looking at the combined
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Table 5: Pooled results for regression of inclusive institutions on per-capita GDP growth
I II III IV V VI
γc
t−1 0.665 *** 0.681 *** 0.635 *** 0.648 *** 0.747 *** 0.742 ***
(0.081) (0.074) (0.056) (0.058) (0.047) (0.051)
Voice and accountability 0.085 ***
(0.027)
Government effectiveness 0.059 ***
(0.018)
Control of corruption 0.057 ***
(0.013)
Rule of law 0.056 ***
(0.015)
GINI index 0.001
(0.008)
Variance in energy intensity -0.075 ***
(0.017)
Private capital fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes
Short-run elasticity
Full-sample 0.593 0.522 0.504 0.443 - -0.078
Short-run elasticity
High network interaction - - - - -0.234 -0.081
Short-run elasticity
Low network interaction 1.046 1.320 1.179 0.860 - -0.059
Short-run elasticity
High competition 0.462 0.411 0.415 0.332 -0.208 -0.103
Short-run elasticity
Low competition 0.348 0.241 0.183 0.172 - -0.038
Hansen J test 26.867 24.005 19.919 18.895 17.099 17.836
0.082 0.155 0.337 0.398 0.516 0.467
Kleibergen-Paap test 26.065 24.577 18.691 18.349 18.496 18.227
0.128 0.175 0.477 0.499 0.490 0.507
Log-likelihood -671.993 -671.027 -671.644 -673.001 -664.093 -578.284
Number of observations 300 300 300 300 296 264
Notes: The dependent variable is the growth rate of per-capita GDP. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at
the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are used across all reported estimates.The set
of instrumental variables common to all specifications are dated t − 2 and earlier to allow for the MA(1) error structure in these first-differenced model
specifications. In more detail, we use lagged observations dated to t − 2 on t − 6 of the log value of per-capita GDP and the share of private capital in
GDP and technology, and employ lagged observations dated t − 2 and t − 3 on a set of additional instruments (trade as a share of GDP and government
spending as a share of GDP). The instrumental variables are the first lag of the growth rate of per-capita GDP and the levels and first differences of the
shares of private capital and technology. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are used across all reported estimates.
short-run elasticity measures linked to institutional factors (columns I-IV), we find that improving each
institutional factor by 1% directly increases the per-capita GDP growth rate by about 2%. This direct effect
becomes even more prominent when indirect links through private capital and technology are added to the
analysis.
5 Conclusions
The main focus of this paper is to explore the relationship between inclusive institutions, innovation and
economic growth. We provide a coherent theoretical framework for this relationship and describe an em-
pirical analysis consistent with the proposed model. Our empirical investigation yields a number of policy
implications regarding the economic growth priority of EU strategy. In sum, our empirical findings first
demonstrates that improvements in political institutions and the quality of the governance have significantly
positive effects on the growth of technology and investment, and that these effects are magnified in a context
characterised by low levels of trust and competition. Second, while a more equitable distribution of income
spurs investment, the influence of a reduction in income inequality on technology growth is significant only
when generalised trust is high. Third, environmentally sustainable institutions positively affect technology
and investment growth and directly increase GDP growth, especially in countries with high levels of trust
and competition. Fourth, the direct effects of political institutions and good governance on GDP growth
are broader in countries with a low level of trust, while the effect of income inequality on GDP growth is
significantly negative in countries characterised by high levels of trust and competition.
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Our results provide compelling evidence that to improve economic performance, national policies should
prioritise interventions targeting social and institutional conditions. To be effective, traditional policies of
subsidising firms for innovation and providing incentives to innovate, must be accompanied by appropriate
social and institutional conditions delivering the kind of interaction and feedback that translate innovative
efforts into economic growth. As a consequence, reforming institutions with the aim of improving governance,
social inclusion and environmental sustainability may generate strong incentives for knowledge diffusion and
the adoption of technological innovation, thus promoting economic growth.
Our empirical analysis also provides an other interesting policy implication. Our estimates show that
to be effective, a strategy of institutional reforms in Europe aimed at increasing social inclusion, innovation
and economic growth should be targeted at the specific mix of social, institutional and economic features
present in each European country. As we have seen, the effects of reforms of the political system, quality of
governance, and the social and environmental sustainability of policies are on balance sensitive to informal
rules (network interactions) and the degree of market competitiveness. The implication of this result is that
the strategy defined by Europe 2020, which identifies general targets without considering the relationship
among different institutions in specific contexts or addressing the appropriate sequencing of reforms, could
either smooth or nullify the effects of policies adopted by individual European countries.
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